Amendments to the Claims:

A listing of the entire set of pending claims (including amendments to the claims, if any) is submitted herewith per 37 CFR 1.121. This listing of claims will replace all prior versions, and listings, of claims in the application.

Listing of Claims:

1. (Original) A method of generating a common secret between a first party and a second party, in which the first party holds a value p_1 and a symmetrical polynomial P(x,y) fixed in the first argument by the value p_1, and the first party performs the steps of sending the value p_1 to the second party, receiving a value p_2 from the second party and calculating the common secret S_1 by evaluating the polynomial $P(p_1, y)$ in p_2, characterized in that the first party additionally holds a value q_1 and a symmetrical polynomial Q(x, z) fixed in the first argument by the value q_1, and further performs the steps of sending q_1 to the second party, receiving a value q_2 from the second party and calculating the secret S_1 as $S_1=Q(q_1, q_2)\cdot P(p_1, p_2)$.

2. (Original) The method of claim 1, in which the first party further performs the steps of obtaining a random number r_1, calculating $r_1\cdot q_1$, sending $r_1\cdot q_1$ to the second party, receiving $r_2\cdot q_2$ from the second party and calculating the secret S_1 as $S_1=Q(q_1, r_1\cdot r_2\cdot q_2)\cdot P(p_1, p_2)$.

3. (Original) The method of claim 2, in which the first party holds the value q_1 multiplied by an arbitrarily chosen value r, and the product $Q(q_1, z)P(p_1, y)$ instead of the individual polynomials $P(p_1, y)$ and $Q(q_1, z)$, and the first party performs the steps of calculating $r_1\cdot r\cdot q_1$, sending $r_1\cdot r\cdot q_1$ to the second party, receiving $r_2\cdot r\cdot q_2$ from the second party and calculating the secret S_1 as $S_1=Q(q_1, r_1\cdot r_2\cdot r\cdot q_2)\cdot P(p_1, p_2)$.

4. (Original) The method of claim 1, in which the second party holds a value p_2 and a value q_2, the symmetrical polynomial P(x, y) fixed in the first argument by the value p_2, the symmetrical polynomial Q(x, z) fixed in the first argument by the value q_2, and the second party performs the steps of sending q_2 to the first party, receiving q_1 from the first party and calculating a secret S_2 as $S_2=Q(q_2, q_1)\cdot P(p_2, p_1)$, whereby the common secret has been generated if the secret S_2 equals the secret S_1.

5. (Original) The method of claim 1, in which a trusted third party performs the steps of choosing a symmetric $(n+1) \times (n+1)$ matrix T, constructing the polynomial P using entries from the matrix T as respective coefficients of the polynomial P, constructing the polynomial Q(x, y), choosing the value p_1, the value p_2, the value q_1 and the value q_2, sending the value p_1, the value q_1, the polynomial P(x, y) fixed in the first argument by the value p_1 and the polynomial Q(x, z) fixed in the first argument by the value q_1 to the first party, and sending the value p_2, the value q_2, the polynomial P(x, y) fixed in the first argument by the value p_2 and the polynomial Q(x, z) fixed in the first argument by the value q_2 to the second party

6. (Original) The method of claim 5, in which the trusted third party further arbitrarily chooses a value r, sends the value $r\cdot q_1$ instead of the value q_1 and the product $Q(q_1, z)P(p_1, y)$ instead of the individual polynomials $P(p_1, y)$ and $Q(q_1, z)$ to the first party and sends the value $r\cdot q_2$ instead of the value q_2 and the product $Q(q_2, z)P(p_2, y)$ instead of the individual polynomials $P(p_2, y)$ and $Q(q_2, z)$ to the second party.

7. (Original) The method of claim 5, in which the trusted third party further performs the steps of

choosing a set comprising *m* values p_i, including the values p_1 and p_2,

calculating a space **A** from the tensor products $\vec{p}_i^V \otimes \vec{p}_j^V$ of the Vandermonde vectors $\vec{p}_i^V$ built from the set of values p_i,

choosing a vector $\vec{\gamma}_1$ and a vector $\vec{\gamma}_2$ from the perpendicular space $\mathbf{A}^\perp$ of the space **A**, constructing a matrix T_{Γ_1} = T+Γ_1 from the vector $\vec{\gamma}_1$ and a matrix T_{Γ_2} = T+Γ_2 from the vector $\vec{\gamma}_2$, constructing a polynomial $P^{\Gamma_1}(x,y)$ using entries from the matrix T_{Γ_1} and sending the polynomial $P^{\Gamma_1}(x,y)$ fixed in the first argument by the value p_1 to the first party, and

constructing a polynomial $P^{\Gamma_2}(x,y)$ using entries from the matrix T_{Γ_2} and sending the polynomial $P^{\Gamma_2}(x,y)$ fixed in the first argument by the value p_2 to the second party.

8. (Original) The method of claim 5, in which a number *m'* of values p_i, and *m'* < *m*, are distributed to additional parties.

9. (Original) The method of claim 1, in which the first party and the second party use a non-linear function on the generated secret S1 and S2, respectively, before using it as a secret key in further communications.

10. (Original) The method of claim 9 in which a one-way hash function is applied to the generated secrets S1 and S2.

11. (Original) The method of claim 9 in which a non-linear function in the form of a polynomial is applied to the generated secrets S1 and S2.

12. (Original) The method of claim 1, further comprising the step of verifying that the second party knows the secret S_1.

13. (Original) The method of claim 12, in which the first party subsequently applies a zero-knowledge protocol to verify that the second party knows the secret S_1.

14. (Original) The method of claim 12, in which the first party subsequently applies a commitment-based protocol to verify that the second party knows the secret S_1.

15. (Original) The method of claim 14, in which the second party uses a symmetric cipher to encrypt a random challenge, and sends the encrypted random challenge to the first party and the first party subsequently uses the same symmetric cipher as a commit function to commit himself to a decryption of the encrypted random challenge.

16. (Currently amended) A system ~~(100)~~ comprising a first party ~~(P)~~, a second party ~~(V)~~ and a trusted third party ~~(TTP)~~, that is arranged to ~~execute the method of claim 1~~ generate a common secret between the first party and the second party, in which the first party holds a value p_1 and a symmetrical polynomial P(x,y) fixed in the first argument by the value p_1, and the first party performs the steps of sending the value p_1 to the second party, receiving a value p_2 from the second party and calculating the common secret S_1 by evaluating the polynomial $P(p_1, y)$ in p_2,

wherein the first party additionally holds a value q_1 and a symmetrical polynomial Q(x, z) fixed in the first argument by the value q_1, and further performs the steps of sending q_1 to the second party, receiving a value q_2 from the second party and calculating the secret S_1 as $S_1=Q(q_1, q_2)\cdot P(p_1, p_2)$.

17. (Original) A device (P) arranged to operate as the first party and/or as the second party in the system of claim 16.

18. (Original) The device of claim 17, comprising storage means (303) for storing the polynomial P and the polynomial Q in the form of their respective coefficients.

19. (Currently amended) A computer program product for causing one or more processors to ~~execute the method of claim 1~~ generate a common secret between a first party and a second party, in which the first party holds a value p_1 and a symmetrical polynomial P(x,y) fixed in the first argument by the value p_1, and the first party performs the steps of sending the value p_1 to the second party, receiving a value p_2 from the second party and calculating the common secret S_1 by evaluating the polynomial $P(p_1, y)$ in p_2,

wherein the first party additionally holds a value q_1 and a symmetrical polynomial Q(x, z) fixed in the first argument by the value q_1, and further performs the steps of sending q_1 to the second party, receiving a value q_2 from the second party and calculating the secret S_1 as $S_1=Q(q_1, q_2)\cdot P(p_1, p_2)$.

20. (New) The system of claim 16, wherein the second party holds a value p_2 and a value q_2, the symmetrical polynomial P(x, y) fixed in the first argument by the value p_2, the symmetrical polynomial Q(x, z) fixed in the first argument by the value q_2, and the second party performs the steps of sending q_2 to the first party, receiving q_1 from the first party and calculating a secret S_2 as $S_2=Q(q_2, q_1)\cdot P(p_2, p_1)$, whereby the common secret has been generated if the secret S_2 equals the secret S_1.